Argumentation

This paper proposes an extension of Inference Anchoring Theory (IAT) that incorporates speaker-centered pragmatic phenomena: arguer identity, phatic speech acts, and emotive speech acts into the analysis of natural-language argumentation. While recent work has shown how ethos can be operationalized within IAT, the theory has not yet accounted for how pathos and phatic functions shape the dialogical conditions under which argumentative acts become felicitous. We argue that the felicity of phatic-maintaining, emotion-appealing, and emotion-expressing acts depends on the speaker’s perceived authorization, and that this authorization is conditioned by the identity projected through personality-based dispositions. We formalize these acts as additional illocutionary types within IAT and model how their acceptance or rejection influences the authorization of a subsequent act of arguing. A qualitative case study of the highest- and lowest-rated speakers in a competitive debate illustrates how differences in personality correspond to distinct patterns of phatic and emotive behavior, resulting in different evaluations of Perceived Argument Strength. The proposed extension provides a framework for analyzing how identity-sensitive authorization dynamics operate in dialogue and offers a foundation for future corpus-based and experimental research on the role of the arguer in argumentation.

Abstract A significant proportion of human reasoning is systematically biased, a fact that sits uneasily with argumentation theory’s methodological commitment to the principle of charity. Traditionally, the principle requires arguments to be reconstructed as plausibly and rationally as possible, which conflicts with the definition of cognitive biases as irrational. The aim of this paper is to show that we can and should integrate cognitive biases into argument reconstruction. Firstly, we demonstrate both the ubiquity and societal consequences of biased reasoning. We then articulate a trilemma for argument analysis: (i) exclude biased reasoning from reconstruction, (ii) redefine it as rational, or (iii) abandon the principle of charity. We argue that this trilemma can be resolved by adopting a nuanced understanding of charity that puts sufficient emphasis on the descriptive standard of accuracy alongside the normative standard of plausibility. By properly pursuing these dual aims, we can account for instances of biased reasoning in argument analysis in terms of the underlying mental states and processes. By taking the effect of the in-group bias in climate skepticism as an instructive example, we present one way of integrating cognitive biases into argument analysis by reconstructing instances of biased reasoning as arguments. The aim of such reconstructions is not to vindicate biased reasoning as epistemically sound, after all, but rather to make its justificatory structure transparent and discussable.

Abstract In argumentation theory, loci - also referred to as topoi - are commonly viewed as abstract sources of inference that guide the invention of arguments. Within the Argument Model of Topics (AMT), loci are analysed as sources of inference underlying individual arguments. This paper extends said view by arguing that loci perform a discourse-directive function beyond the level of individual arguments. This function is understood in an analytical sense and refers to how loci orient argumentative interaction by indicating the inferential relations along which issues become arguable in particular ways, such as procedural conditions, goals, constrained choices, conceptual boundaries, or source evaluation. Situated at the meso-level of analysis, this function exceeds the micro-level reconstruction of individual arguments while preceding the identification of recurring argumentative patterns at the macro-level. This paper shows how the reappearance of premises in extended debates, when repeatedly connected to conclusions through the same loci , recurrently instantiates the same inferential relations that orient argumentative interaction. These recurrent inferential relations do not themselves constitute argumentative patterns, but repetition makes these relations empirically traceable across argumentative contributions before the stabilization of argumentative patterns. The analytical framework is illustrated by examples from the controversy of nuclear energy production.

Abstract This paper offers a pragma-dialectical reconstruction of AI-authorship accusations directed at human discussants: the charge that a contribution is machine-generated or not attributable to a responsible participant. Such an accusation is best understood not as a factual label but as a meta-level procedural move. Introduced during the argumentation stage, it can shift the exchange from the merits of a standpoint to the discussant’s status and the admissibility of starting points, and under specified procedural consequences it triggers a nested opening-stage sub-discussion while leaving the original difference of opinion intact. The paper names the configuration in which discussant status, admissible commitments, and sufficiency thresholds are jointly reclassified procedural capture, and gives the conditions that mark it off from an ordinary personal attack or premise misuse. Its contribution is a symmetrical, default-governed repair protocol, with a warrant-filter for detector-based evidence, that restores critical testing of the original standpoint. The claim is normative rather than descriptive: the worked examples are analytic reconstructions.

Abstract This paper advances a unified account of how argumentative influence can align with epistemic agency by reframing the distinction between invitational and persuasion rhetoric. Drawing on Foss and Griffin’s (1995) influential articulation of invitational rhetoric as grounded in equality, immanent value, and self-determination, I argue that invitational communication inherently positions addressees as reason receivers —agents capable of understanding, evaluating, and endorsing reasons through their own rational capacities. In such settings, perspective change, when it occurs, constitutes rational self-persuasion , an internal process grounded in the addressee’s judgment of the speaker’s reasons. Foss and Griffin contrast this with persuasion rhetoric, holding that persuasion aims to modify others’ attitudes and thereby risks producing compliance under influence through pressure amplified by unbracketed power differentials. I contend, however, that this criticism targets only a subset of persuasion: persuasion that is purely uptake-driven. Building on insights from Gearhart (1979), Tindale (1999), and contemporary persuasion theory (e.g., O’Keefe 2016), I defend the rational persuasion thesis, according to which a speaker’s intention to rationally persuade is the intention to have addressees persuade themselves by judging the speaker’s premises to be reasons they themselves have. When persuasion is so understood, the speaker’s intention is inherently aligned with epistemic agency and motivates the creation of rhetorical environments marked by safety, value, and freedom—conditions Foss and Griffin take to be distinctive of invitational rhetoric. I conclude that argumentation respects epistemic agency not by forgoing influence, but by aiming at rational self-persuasion, thereby distinguishing rational from merely causal forms of rhetorical efficacy.

Abstract In this paper, we propose a conceptual framework to understand and examine the argumentative content in multimodal protest. Protests arise in public controversies when people are dissatisfied with the way institutions deal with problems in society, and when conventional routes for addressing these issues are deemed problematic, especially for the powerless. Protest typically involves not only verbal expressions, but also the use of images, and bodily performances. While protest and other forms of activism are extensively explored from various perspectives, its argumentative role is understudied. In this paper, we show that protest not only contributes to public controversies through intervention (e.g. social or cognitive pressure), but also through communication. The argumentative value lies in the (multimodal) communicative dimension of protest: we can understand protest as a communicative act that uses multimodal means to express disapproval about something and to advocate a remedy. We argue that protest contributes arguments to a public controversy by (1) expressing a core argument that addresses potential critical reactions to the claims intrinsic to any protest, and by (2) providing, what we call, proto-arguments, i.e. pieces of information that the audience can use to argue in support of the protest at future occasions. Using the case study of Extinction Rebellion’s highway blockades in the Hague in the Netherlands, we illustrate the pattern of the core argument of protest and three types of proto-arguments. By broadening the scope of argumentation, we invite argumentation scholars to take multimodal protest seriously.

Abstract While Presidential debates present policy positions, they also construct group identities. This article asks how argumentative structures and linguistic choices work together to produce the “We” identity and “Them” identity that is characteristic of polarised political discourse. We analyse the 2024 Trump–Harris debate by integrating only argumentation schemes into the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) for its approach to argumentation. Three questions guide our analysis: how argumentation schemes construct in-group and out-group identities; how do lexical choices, analysed through DHA’s nomination strategy, construct in-group/out-group identities; and whether patterned relationships exist between scheme types and discursive strategies. Drawing on 24 reconstructed arguments and six in-depth analyses, we observe that ad hominem attacks and poisoning-the-well arguments tend to co-occur with predication and perspectivisation strategies, while arguments from consequences tend to co-occur with justification. We term these patterned relationships schematic affinities and offer the concept as a hypothesis warranting systematic investigation rather than a confirmed finding. Lexical devices, including terms that categorise actors as criminals, victims, or workers, reinforce the opposition that arguments establish. The framework demonstrates how argumentation theory and Critical Discourse Studies can inform one another, and it opens pathways for research on national identity formation, racism, and discriminatory discourse.

Abstract Experimental argumentation research allows researchers to test normative predictions from argumentation theory. In the domain of argument quality, for instance, numerous studies have supported the prediction that high-quality arguments should lead to better claim acceptance than low-quality arguments. These studies also examined factors moderating this effect, such as text length, and cultural background of the receiver. The current experiment adds another factor: incongruity between arguments. By presenting participants with arguments and counterarguments, they were put in a circumstance of incongruity, leading to higher elaboration of arguments and, therefore, to sensitivity to argument quality. Such sensitivity was found to be absent for French participants in an earlier study, but present for Dutch participants. The current study examined whether such sensitivity occurred for both national samples under the circumstance of argument incongruity. Dutch and French students ( N  = 544) indicated their acceptance of claims followed by statistical evidence and normatively strong or weak expert evidence, each of which served as argument in some cases and as counterargument in others. Analyses showed that normatively strong expert evidence was more persuasive than normatively weak expert evidence for Dutch participants, but that evidence quality did not affect claim acceptance for French participants. Implications for a cultural explanation for the French result are discussed.

Abstract Twentieth century innovations in reasoning about health and medicine (randomized clinical trials, systematic reviews, and a growing list of other inventions) have dramatically changed what counts as good argumentation within this domain. Though these new forms are often highly specialized and highly technical, they are gradually becoming “norms of public argumentation” (Zenker, et al., 2024), spreading from esoteric discussion among medical scientists into other discourses (including interpersonal exchanges between doctors and patients). This pattern is not limited to health and medicine but affects so many domains that it has become ubiquitous in contemporary argumentative discourse. But innovations aimed at improving reasonableness, when successful, can disrupt preexisting normative frameworks. They can undermine and supplant prior bases for inference, abruptly change standards for argument criticism, and require adoption of different rules for argumentative engagement. The study reported here concerns the volatility that surrounds these innovations in a case study of debate over a controversial treatment for a controversial disease. Close examination of the debate from a normative pragmatic perspective shows much greater normative complexity than has been acknowledged within contemporary argumentation theory, including unexpected volatility in norms that arguers themselves must somehow manage.

This study assesses whether the linguistic choices that Van Haaften and Van Leeuwen identified in the so-called ‘Van Gelder’ court case (as reported in a.o. Journal of Argumentation in Context 10(1), 97-120, 2021) have empirically demonstrable argumentative effects. This case revolves around proceedings that Yuri van Gelder brought against the Dutch Olympic committee, given his removal from the Olympic gymnastics final due to misbehaviour. Van Haaften and Van Leeuwen’s analysis demonstrates that the lawyers used a variety of linguistic choices in their pleas that are argumentatively instrumental for defending their position: Van Gelder’s lawyer uses a series of linguistic choices that serve to minimise the reprehensibility of Van Gelder’s behaviour and paint him as a victim, while the Dutch Olympic committee lawyer’s linguistic choices maximise the reprehensibility of the behaviour and frame Van Gelder as solely responsible for his situation. 209 participants read either an original or a manipulated fragment of one of the pleas and evaluated the reprehensibility of Van Gelder’s behaviour, his responsibility for the situation and their agreement with the judge’s decision (which favoured the Dutch Olympic committee). Results suggest that whether participants had read the original or the manipulated plea did not affect their evaluations. The content of the pleas did matter, however, as participants who read the plea by the Dutch Olympic committee lawyer were more negative about Van Gelder than those who had read Van Gelder’s lawyer’s plea. While the topical selection choices thus do seem to affect readers’ evaluations, our linguistic manipulations of the argumentative moves may have been too subtle to make a difference.

Nurturing the ability to argue is of great importance in science education, despite students often encountering cognitive and emotional barriers. The aim of this study was to examine the quality of argumentation and the issues raised by secondary school students when they are asked to respond to structured argumentation tasks. We chose topics from two different socio-scientific issues of varied perceived relevance to students’ daily lives: the sale of fast food in school canteens (Group 1) and the addition of antibiotics in animal feed (Group 2). The study involved 249 high school students aged 14–16, in Poland. A total of 139 participants took part in an intervention about fast food, and 110 in an intervention about the use of antibiotics. Data were collected in the form of written arguments developed by students as part of a structured teaching intervention. Quantitative and qualitative methods were used to process and analyze the data. On average, students’ arguments scored higher on the topic of antibiotic use on animal feed. Qualitative content analysis of the students’ arguments identified four thematic groups: (1) personal aspects revealing personal meanings, values, and defence mechanisms; (2) scientific aspects revealing substantive knowledge; (3) socio-cultural aspects revealing economic, sociological or cultural aspects; (4) nonsensical or incoherent arguments. A topic related to students’ personal decisions and perceived to be closest to their lives and daily experience (eating fast food in the school canteen) more often prompted arguments indicating cognitive defence, by denying the harmfulness of fast food and emphasizing possible advantages or appealing to the right to choose. Based on this finding, we discuss the need for defence mechanisms to be considered in pedagogical designs for the teaching of argumentation.

Research on conditional reasoning has long debated whether human rationality is best captured by logicist accounts or by pragmatically oriented approaches such as Relevance Theory, which highlight contextual and communicative factors. While the former predict reliable adherence to logical schemata (e.g., Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens), experimental evidence consistently reveals systematic deviations, such as endorsement of invalid inferences. The latter view attributes such patterns not to irrationality, but to pragmatic expectations that guide interpretation. This study contributes to this debate by examining how logical validity and pragmatic congruency jointly shape the evaluation of conditional arguments. We report two experiments employing a 2 × 2 factorial design. In Experiment 1, participants evaluated conditional syllogisms framed in the standard 'if/then' format. Results showed that pragmatic violations slowed responses and, crucially, facilitated detection of logical invalidity, without hindering performance on valid arguments. Experiment 2 reformulated the same arguments using the Periodic Table of Arguments to replace 'if/then' conditionals with lever-based structures. Here, participants exhibited a generalized tendency to resist conditional inference, resulting in improved rejection of invalid arguments but reduced recognition of valid ones. Across both studies, pragmatic congruency alone did not predict accuracy, but interactions between pragmatic expectations and logical form systematically influenced evaluations. Taken together, the findings suggest that pragmatics does not override logic but modulates its accessibility: violations of pragmatic expectations invite deliberation. At the same time, semantic scaffolding, such as explicit 'if/then' cues, supports deductive reasoning. We propose that natural argumentation depends on this interplay, highlighting the need for situated accounts of logos.

Previous research in argumentation has closely examined distortions of the opposition—particularly the straw man—and has recently provided some experimental evidence on their effects on persuasive outcomes. However, comparatively little empirical attention has been given to the inverse practice of faithfully reformulating an opponent’s contribution. The effects of accurate and inaccurate representations on speaker ethos and perceived reasonableness also remain underexplored. This paper addresses these gaps through three pre-registered experimental studies comparing accurate reformulation, misrepresentation, and no reformulation of the opposition. Experiment 1 assesses the impact of these practices on perceived trustworthiness using a six-item, 7-point semantic differential scale. Experiment 2 examines judgments of reasonableness using a scale repeatedly employed in pragma-dialectical effectiveness research. Experiment 3 measures persuasiveness at both the attitudinal and behavioral intention levels. Participants read a series of pre-tested argumentative exchanges between two speakers in a charitable-giving context. Results show that, in the cases examined, misrepresenting the opposition negatively impacted both trustworthiness and reasonableness judgments, addressing concerns that adhering to dialectical standards may diminish rhetorical success.

The paper investigates whether contradictory arguments are less likely to be noticed when they are expressed implicitly rather than explicitly. It builds on the fact that—in natural language productions—contradictions are often not logical but rather—lato sensu—pragmatic in nature. The study presents an experiment using ecological and slightly modified material. In a Facebook post, Italian journalist Selvaggia Lucarelli conveyed two contradictory arguments through implicatures, presuppositions and vague expressions. This text was presented to experimental subjects: half read the original version, while the other half read a version in which the implicit content had been made explicit. Their responses to specific questions indicate that the contradiction is more easily noticed when it occurs between explicit assertions rather than between arguments that must be at least partially inferred. A strong effect is observed in relation to age and education differences among the groups. These results may provide experimental insight into the conditions under which argumentation flawed by contradictions may still achieve its intended effect, as if the contradiction were not present.

Argumentation is at the core of political communication. We study what criteria people use when they evaluate argument quality. We ask how justification content and argument source – who presents the argument – influence perceived argument quality, as well as how these two interact. Regarding justification content, we rely on criteria derived from deliberative democracy, and separate appeals to common or private interests. Regarding argument source, we study partial, impartial and reluctant sources. The promoted policy is in accordance with the interests of partial sources, it conflicts with the interests of reluctant sources, whereas impartial sources’ interests are not affected. We observed that appeals to common interest yielded higher perceived argument and justification quality compared to appeals to private interests. Our central observation was that sources did not influence perceived argument quality, unless arguments appealed to private interests. In other words, the influence of the argument source was contingent on argument content.

Abstract The use of social media influencers as a rhetorical strategy contributes significantly to reshaping Emmanuel Macron’s public image. Aimed at countering the perception of distance conveyed in his initial Covid-19 speeches, this study explores the strategy’s rhetorical mechanisms, illustrated by a surprising encounter with two Youtubers, presented as a reward. I argue that Macron’s ethos is redefined through a deliberate balance between authority and proximity – both crucial to his image repair. The influencers’ unique format enables the implementation of this dual strategy, but they go even further by functioning as intermediaries who assist the president in adapting his discourse to align with the expectations, language, and values of their followers. In this encounter, ethos serves as both a means and an end. The collaboration between the politician and the influencers raises several critical questions: How is the strategy constructed? Who holds authority, and upon which models of authority does each party construct and articulate their discourse? How does this interaction affect the president’s style and language? What are the characteristics of their interaction? This analysis explores how influencers shape Macron’s communication and reveals distinctive features of his rhetoric within this unique format. In doing so, broader questions emerge about the boundaries between rhetoric, argumentation, and manipulation.

Discussions about multimodal argumentation have long been hindered by doubts about whether non-verbal artifacts can express propositions. The opponents of multimodal argumentation have stated that semiotic modes other than language lack the precision required to express verifiable statements about the world. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the account of propositions presented in speech act theory is suitable for analyzing multimodal communication, which is why multimodal argumentation can be studied in the pragma-dialectical tradition. By connecting Searle’s approach with the pragma-dialectic argumentation schemes, I suggest that the propositional act is constructed of three, and not two, elements: referring expression, predicating quality, and proposition scheme, the latter being a characterization of the relationship between the first two. I derive proposition schemes directly from argumentation schemes, noticing that the pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes actually characterize the relationship within propositions, and not between them. Based on that notion, I argue that when interacting with seemingly ambiguous multimodal artifacts, the receiver automatically chooses the most probable connection between the referring expression and the predicating quality from the list of proposition schemes, explaining why multimodal communication can be easily interpreted intuitively. Finally, I analyze several argumentative examples to illustrate how the proposition schemes can be used in reconstructing the reasoning expressed multimodally.

The phenomenon of selective dispute avoidance is that there are issues we debate and issues we recoil from debating, despite the fact that they are very similar in values at stake. What accounts for this variance? That some disagreements are deep and engagements on some deep issues yields meta-argumentatively bad results is a plausible explanation. However, practical second-order rebutting reasons to these considerations are proposed, essentially that not engaging has foreseeably worse consequences than engaging. What favors engagement, then, is that only when engaged can one address the negative second-order reasons one yields on either approach. What follows is a pragmatic meta-argument for engagement, even in cases of deep disagreement.

The role of interrogative sentences in political argumentation remains largely unexplored. This study addresses this gap by introducing a new Polish-language dataset featuring diverse examples of interrogative sentences in political discourse (election debates). The dataset serves as a unique resource for theoretical research in Argumentation Mining and Natural Language Inference through the annotation of ⟨IS, C⟩ and ⟨IS, P⟩ pairs, where IS denotes an interrogative sentence, C represents its corresponding conclusion, and P indicates a premise. The annotations primarily capture implicitly expressed argumentative structures and can serve as a benchmark for large language models (LLMs), particularly those trained on Polish-language data. Furthermore, this is the first study in Argumentation Mining where annotators independently verbalize the content of conclusions and premises conveyed through speech acts constructed with interrogative sentences. Our findings reveal that interrogative sentences in political debates most frequently function as implicature (approx. 45%), normative propositions (approx. 31%), statements expressing epistemic states (approx. 20%), and presuppositions (approx. 4%). Semantic similarity analysis confirms that annotators achieve a high level of consistency in identifying and verbalizing the content implied by interrogative sentences. The dataset provides a robust foundation for developing advanced language models and for further research into the role of interrogative sentences in political discourse.

Abstract Argumentation occurring in public controversies (large, long-lasting, and complex disagreements) deserve more attention from argumentation theorists than they have yet received, primarily because they offer plentiful opportunity to discover new facts about the contemporary practice of argumentation. Drawing on the polylogue framework (Lewiński and Aakhus 2023) and the cartography of controversy (Venturini and Munk 2022), nine suggestions are offered for how to build new theoretical knowledge through observational research that combines classic techniques in qualitative social science with emerging computational techniques: (1) aim for observationally grounded theory; (2) anchor analysis in argumentative texts; (3) practice constant comparison; (4) build outward from individual texts to networks; (5) investigate the places where texts are produced; (6) pay attention to the literatures where texts accumulate; (7) leverage computational techniques for natural language processing of large bodies of text; (8) reserve judgment on matters of disagreement within the controversy; and (9) try team science. Recent argument-centered studies of controversies demonstrate aspects of this approach and show its promise for discovering interesting and novel phenomena.

Abstract A very basic intuition is that argumentation is about giving reasons. This is recognized, for example, when it is stated that the object of study of argumentation theory is argumentative practices that consist, in whole or in part, but, at least, to a significant extent, of asking for, giving, and examining reasons. But this consensus does not translate into theory. In fact, reasons occupy a modest place in argumentation theory. Logical properties can be understood in terms of reasons or in terms of inferences, and in this sense, we can contrast reasons-based theories of argument with inference-based theories of argument. I will first show that the distinction between reasons-based and inference-based theories of argument is robust, and that there is a real difference between them. I will then argue that, as far as argumentation is concerned, a logical approach based on reasons is preferable to one based on inferences.

Abstract Enthymemes are arguments that are not fully articulated, often omitting a connection between premise and conclusion but sometimes also other information that is crucial for their interpretation. This implicitness poses challenges for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. We use the concept of “argument form” as employed in the argument classification framework of the Periodic Table of Arguments to address this issue. By developing an algorithmic procedure grounded in this concept, we provide a method for explicating missing statements and connections condensed in enthymemes. Our approach contributes to understanding the pragmatics of argumentation, as it offers a formal framework for analysing how the interpretation of implicit elements in argumentation arises from apparent non-sequiturs. The algorithmic procedure we developed can function as a guideline for human annotation of argumentative discourse and is also suitable for implementation in (AI-assisted) annotation software for argument mining.

The aim of this paper is to distinguish some varieties of what I call ‘comparison argumentation.’ This way of arguing consists of supporting a claim about one thing on the basis of a comparison of that thing with another. The criteria that I use are the subject, the degree, and the purpose of the comparison. I do not intend to be exhaustive, but to address two specific questions: what sets arguments by analogy apart within this category and, from there, how they can be evaluated based on their distinctive features. An important aspect of my approach is the analysis of cases. I have selected a relatively large corpus of examples, mainly from the news media, and will analyse them based on argumentative connectors and other conventional indicators of comparisons.

This paper investigates the relationship between practical argumentation (PA) and Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST). PA is argumentation providing justification for an agent’s action. PA has been described in terms of a three-level structure composed of practical, evaluative, and classificatory argumentation schemes. RST is a linguistic theory that models the hierarchical structure of monological discourse in terms of discourse coherence relations. RST’s Motivation relation is intended to increase an agent’s inclination to perform some action. Our investigative approach was to analyze argumentation schemes of PA in examples of RST involving Motivation and to analyze RST structure for texts that have been used as examples of PA. The results of the investigation show uses, not only of Motivation, but also RST’s Antithesis, Concession, Evaluation, and Solutionhood. In some cases the RST analysis reflects the layered composition of argumentation schemes of PA.

Abstract Metaphors abound in scientific discourse. Well-known examples include ‘the brain as a computer’ and ‘the organism as a machine’. Such metaphors, we argue, have both a theoretical and a practical aspect: they may serve as explanatory models, but also guide technological development, influence policy, reflect ideological assumptions, and reshape how we understand ourselves. These practical dimensions have prompted growing concern about the risks associated with metaphor use in science. While this concern has been widely noted, less attention has been paid to the argumentative forms such criticism may take. This article addresses that gap by reconstructing resistance to scientific metaphors—specifically computer and machine metaphors—as a form of pragmatic argumentation, in which metaphor use is challenged on the basis of its practical consequences. It further shows how such argumentation may be supported by subordinate causal arguments that appeal to the metaphor’s highlighting/hiding structure. Drawing on the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, and analyzing examples from cognitive science, philosophy, and bioethics, the article demonstrates how metaphor resistance can be understood as a reconstructable form of argumentative critique—one in which metaphors become sites of normative contestation.

Abstract This study aims to analyze the perceptions of Spanish secondary school teachers in the fields of social and experimental sciences (n = 215) regarding the formative relevance of argumentative competence in the context of citizenship education. It also seeks to provide a psychometric instrument supported by robust empirical evidence of reliability and validity to achieve this goal. Based on a non-experimental, cross-sectional design, the AASES (Assessment of Argumentation in Social and Experimental Sciences) instrument,—developed ad hoc,—is administered to identify the potential relationship of sociodemographic factors with the theoretical subconstructs it comprises, the statistical association between age, origin, and gender, and the mediating role of gender in the relationship between age/place of origin and the defined latent factors, and the existence of significant differences among sociodemographic groups. The results indicate that, although a statistical association between age and gender was observed, the mediating role of gender in the relationship between age, origin, and the latent factors cannot be confirmed. SEM analyses showed that none of the sociodemographic predictors (age, origin, and gender) exert statistically significant direct or mediating effects on the latent factors. Furthermore, the comparative analyses complement the model by indicating that perceptions vary moderately by gender and age, even though these variables do not explain the latent factors in the SEM. Indeed, the analysis of variance revealed significant differences in the Critical and Ethical Skills dimension based on these two factors, with higher scores among male teachers and in the oldest age group, as well as increasing trends, with age, in the perceived importance of argumentation for the development and acquisition of critical thinking skills, informed decision-making, and ethical discussion. The findings highlight the need to incorporate specific spaces within the curriculum and teacher education programs to foster argumentative competencies and informed engagement with controversial socio-scientific issues, taking into account sociodemographic variables as influential factors in the educational process.

Abstract This work advocates for an alternative to the principle of charity when teaching critical thinking or informal logic. It provides a brief reconstruction of the principle in the context of argumentation before moving to demonstrate some of the shortcomings associated with different approaches to it in the literature. It argues for placing emphasis not on charity but on the interpretative competence that underlies charity. Doing so avoids the difficulties associated with the principle as such while still fostering the conditions for exploring the kinds of advanced interpretations the pursuit of charity typically yields.

Abstract In contemporary literature on argumentation, it is well-established that various genres of fiction can be used to present argumentation. For instance, in political satires, authors argue why a certain political situation is undesirable. Similarly, authors of fables argue—by means of animals as characters—that certain behaviour is desirable or unacceptable. Characteristically, authors of fiction create a fictional world in which their narratives take place. This collides with the sincerity conditions of the speech act complex of argumentation: preliminary conditions that should be satisfied for argumentation to be performed correctly. Firstly, these sincerity conditions require the arguer to believe that their standpoint is acceptable. Second, the arguer should believe that the statements they make to justify their standpoint are acceptable and third, the arguer should believe that these statements constitute an acceptable justification of their standpoint. As such, when argumentation meets fiction, the sincerity conditions do not align: how can authors—as arguers—actually believe that their uttered statements are acceptable, if these statements are oftentimes not true? The aim of this paper is to show both how proponents can accept propositions in fiction while still following argumentation’s sincerity conditions.

Abstract Part of the business of argumentation theory involves resolving a conceptual dispute over what argumentation and argument are in the first place. This dispute has produced various “concepts of argument.” The goal of this paper is twofold: (1) to develop a complete ontology of argumentative phenomena, capable of accounting for various conceptions of argument—something, as I argue, that is badly wanting in argumentation theory; and, within this ontology, (2) to defend a position that there is but one concept of argument needed to grasp these diverse phenomena and conceptions of argument and argumentation. I move in four steps. First, I briefly sketch the discussion over arguments-as-activities and arguments-as-products. Second, I go back to the classic work of Twardowski on actions and products and adapt it for argumentation theory, producing a complex yet systematically organized conceptual ontology of argument and argumentation. This conceptual housekeeping allows me, third, to critically engage some of the recent, Frege-inspired philosophical literature on the concept of argument, while defending act-based approaches to argument(ation). Fourth, I present a positive proposal of a minimal, contrastivist concept of argument as a set of reasons advanced to support a conclusion C 1 rather than another conclusion C n .

In this study, we identify the pedagogical practices the science teachers use for successfully conducting their argumentation-based science lessons and examine the process of managing informal formative assessments. For this qualitative study, we collected data via video and audio devices from classroom implementations after conducting two professional development courses on assessment practices in inquiry settings and argumentation in science classrooms. We analysed the data from the conversation analysis (CA) perspective to conduct a data-driven study. Our results show that there are multiple pedagogical practices that teachers use to achieve lesson purposes and shape lessons. These are primarily the revealing of different claims and warrants or counterarguments about the same phenomenon or situation, prompting the class to discuss different arguments, including more than one student in interaction. Regarding the nature of answers produced by students, the teachers also make implicit or explicit positive and negative assessments, avoid explicit assessments, and give content feedback as pedagogical practices and use them for managing the informal formative assessment process. The results show that the teachers perform some pedagogical practices via the information gained by the informal formative assessment process. These pedagogical practices provide them with new road maps to achieve the lesson goal by increasing classroom interactions.

Abstract In numerous communicative practices, particularly in social media communication, it has become common to encounter messages pursuing a multiplicity of possible functions. They provide information, but sharing it is not their only or most important purpose. They appear to advocate for a particular viewpoint, yet no specific conclusion is stated, no argumentative or persuasive context surrounds them, and no dialectical exchanges follow or precede them. From a practical perspective, such messages, designated as “info-arguments,” are powerful strategies for advancing reasons, enabling the speaker to avoid the corresponding burden of proof. From a theoretical perspective, they challenge the pragmatic theories of meaning underlying argument reconstruction. Absent a specific context and considering the composite nature of an audience characterized by diverse backgrounds, how can we establish and justify that an info-argument conveys an argument? This paper proposes an analytical framework based on a dynamic and dialectical approach to meaning. In this view, the meaning of an info-argument is not represented as a pre-existing speaker’s intention manifested in a clear communication setting. Instead, it is regarded as a set of distinct, least defeasible interpretations characterizing various possible scenarios defined by several factors (or presumptions) that vary depending on the interlocutors’ backgrounds and values.