Argumentation

This paper proposes an extension of Inference Anchoring Theory (IAT) that incorporates speaker-centered pragmatic phenomena: arguer identity, phatic speech acts, and emotive speech acts into the analysis of natural-language argumentation. While recent work has shown how ethos can be operationalized within IAT, the theory has not yet accounted for how pathos and phatic functions shape the dialogical conditions under which argumentative acts become felicitous. We argue that the felicity of phatic-maintaining, emotion-appealing, and emotion-expressing acts depends on the speaker’s perceived authorization, and that this authorization is conditioned by the identity projected through personality-based dispositions. We formalize these acts as additional illocutionary types within IAT and model how their acceptance or rejection influences the authorization of a subsequent act of arguing. A qualitative case study of the highest- and lowest-rated speakers in a competitive debate illustrates how differences in personality correspond to distinct patterns of phatic and emotive behavior, resulting in different evaluations of Perceived Argument Strength. The proposed extension provides a framework for analyzing how identity-sensitive authorization dynamics operate in dialogue and offers a foundation for future corpus-based and experimental research on the role of the arguer in argumentation.

Abstract A significant proportion of human reasoning is systematically biased, a fact that sits uneasily with argumentation theory’s methodological commitment to the principle of charity. Traditionally, the principle requires arguments to be reconstructed as plausibly and rationally as possible, which conflicts with the definition of cognitive biases as irrational. The aim of this paper is to show that we can and should integrate cognitive biases into argument reconstruction. Firstly, we demonstrate both the ubiquity and societal consequences of biased reasoning. We then articulate a trilemma for argument analysis: (i) exclude biased reasoning from reconstruction, (ii) redefine it as rational, or (iii) abandon the principle of charity. We argue that this trilemma can be resolved by adopting a nuanced understanding of charity that puts sufficient emphasis on the descriptive standard of accuracy alongside the normative standard of plausibility. By properly pursuing these dual aims, we can account for instances of biased reasoning in argument analysis in terms of the underlying mental states and processes. By taking the effect of the in-group bias in climate skepticism as an instructive example, we present one way of integrating cognitive biases into argument analysis by reconstructing instances of biased reasoning as arguments. The aim of such reconstructions is not to vindicate biased reasoning as epistemically sound, after all, but rather to make its justificatory structure transparent and discussable.

Abstract In argumentation theory, loci - also referred to as topoi - are commonly viewed as abstract sources of inference that guide the invention of arguments. Within the Argument Model of Topics (AMT), loci are analysed as sources of inference underlying individual arguments. This paper extends said view by arguing that loci perform a discourse-directive function beyond the level of individual arguments. This function is understood in an analytical sense and refers to how loci orient argumentative interaction by indicating the inferential relations along which issues become arguable in particular ways, such as procedural conditions, goals, constrained choices, conceptual boundaries, or source evaluation. Situated at the meso-level of analysis, this function exceeds the micro-level reconstruction of individual arguments while preceding the identification of recurring argumentative patterns at the macro-level. This paper shows how the reappearance of premises in extended debates, when repeatedly connected to conclusions through the same loci , recurrently instantiates the same inferential relations that orient argumentative interaction. These recurrent inferential relations do not themselves constitute argumentative patterns, but repetition makes these relations empirically traceable across argumentative contributions before the stabilization of argumentative patterns. The analytical framework is illustrated by examples from the controversy of nuclear energy production.

Abstract This paper offers a pragma-dialectical reconstruction of AI-authorship accusations directed at human discussants: the charge that a contribution is machine-generated or not attributable to a responsible participant. Such an accusation is best understood not as a factual label but as a meta-level procedural move. Introduced during the argumentation stage, it can shift the exchange from the merits of a standpoint to the discussant’s status and the admissibility of starting points, and under specified procedural consequences it triggers a nested opening-stage sub-discussion while leaving the original difference of opinion intact. The paper names the configuration in which discussant status, admissible commitments, and sufficiency thresholds are jointly reclassified procedural capture, and gives the conditions that mark it off from an ordinary personal attack or premise misuse. Its contribution is a symmetrical, default-governed repair protocol, with a warrant-filter for detector-based evidence, that restores critical testing of the original standpoint. The claim is normative rather than descriptive: the worked examples are analytic reconstructions.

Abstract This paper advances a unified account of how argumentative influence can align with epistemic agency by reframing the distinction between invitational and persuasion rhetoric. Drawing on Foss and Griffin’s (1995) influential articulation of invitational rhetoric as grounded in equality, immanent value, and self-determination, I argue that invitational communication inherently positions addressees as reason receivers —agents capable of understanding, evaluating, and endorsing reasons through their own rational capacities. In such settings, perspective change, when it occurs, constitutes rational self-persuasion , an internal process grounded in the addressee’s judgment of the speaker’s reasons. Foss and Griffin contrast this with persuasion rhetoric, holding that persuasion aims to modify others’ attitudes and thereby risks producing compliance under influence through pressure amplified by unbracketed power differentials. I contend, however, that this criticism targets only a subset of persuasion: persuasion that is purely uptake-driven. Building on insights from Gearhart (1979), Tindale (1999), and contemporary persuasion theory (e.g., O’Keefe 2016), I defend the rational persuasion thesis, according to which a speaker’s intention to rationally persuade is the intention to have addressees persuade themselves by judging the speaker’s premises to be reasons they themselves have. When persuasion is so understood, the speaker’s intention is inherently aligned with epistemic agency and motivates the creation of rhetorical environments marked by safety, value, and freedom—conditions Foss and Griffin take to be distinctive of invitational rhetoric. I conclude that argumentation respects epistemic agency not by forgoing influence, but by aiming at rational self-persuasion, thereby distinguishing rational from merely causal forms of rhetorical efficacy.

Abstract In this paper, we propose a conceptual framework to understand and examine the argumentative content in multimodal protest. Protests arise in public controversies when people are dissatisfied with the way institutions deal with problems in society, and when conventional routes for addressing these issues are deemed problematic, especially for the powerless. Protest typically involves not only verbal expressions, but also the use of images, and bodily performances. While protest and other forms of activism are extensively explored from various perspectives, its argumentative role is understudied. In this paper, we show that protest not only contributes to public controversies through intervention (e.g. social or cognitive pressure), but also through communication. The argumentative value lies in the (multimodal) communicative dimension of protest: we can understand protest as a communicative act that uses multimodal means to express disapproval about something and to advocate a remedy. We argue that protest contributes arguments to a public controversy by (1) expressing a core argument that addresses potential critical reactions to the claims intrinsic to any protest, and by (2) providing, what we call, proto-arguments, i.e. pieces of information that the audience can use to argue in support of the protest at future occasions. Using the case study of Extinction Rebellion’s highway blockades in the Hague in the Netherlands, we illustrate the pattern of the core argument of protest and three types of proto-arguments. By broadening the scope of argumentation, we invite argumentation scholars to take multimodal protest seriously.

Abstract While Presidential debates present policy positions, they also construct group identities. This article asks how argumentative structures and linguistic choices work together to produce the “We” identity and “Them” identity that is characteristic of polarised political discourse. We analyse the 2024 Trump–Harris debate by integrating only argumentation schemes into the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) for its approach to argumentation. Three questions guide our analysis: how argumentation schemes construct in-group and out-group identities; how do lexical choices, analysed through DHA’s nomination strategy, construct in-group/out-group identities; and whether patterned relationships exist between scheme types and discursive strategies. Drawing on 24 reconstructed arguments and six in-depth analyses, we observe that ad hominem attacks and poisoning-the-well arguments tend to co-occur with predication and perspectivisation strategies, while arguments from consequences tend to co-occur with justification. We term these patterned relationships schematic affinities and offer the concept as a hypothesis warranting systematic investigation rather than a confirmed finding. Lexical devices, including terms that categorise actors as criminals, victims, or workers, reinforce the opposition that arguments establish. The framework demonstrates how argumentation theory and Critical Discourse Studies can inform one another, and it opens pathways for research on national identity formation, racism, and discriminatory discourse.

Abstract Experimental argumentation research allows researchers to test normative predictions from argumentation theory. In the domain of argument quality, for instance, numerous studies have supported the prediction that high-quality arguments should lead to better claim acceptance than low-quality arguments. These studies also examined factors moderating this effect, such as text length, and cultural background of the receiver. The current experiment adds another factor: incongruity between arguments. By presenting participants with arguments and counterarguments, they were put in a circumstance of incongruity, leading to higher elaboration of arguments and, therefore, to sensitivity to argument quality. Such sensitivity was found to be absent for French participants in an earlier study, but present for Dutch participants. The current study examined whether such sensitivity occurred for both national samples under the circumstance of argument incongruity. Dutch and French students ( N  = 544) indicated their acceptance of claims followed by statistical evidence and normatively strong or weak expert evidence, each of which served as argument in some cases and as counterargument in others. Analyses showed that normatively strong expert evidence was more persuasive than normatively weak expert evidence for Dutch participants, but that evidence quality did not affect claim acceptance for French participants. Implications for a cultural explanation for the French result are discussed.

Abstract I propose a distinction between evidentiary and argumentative modes of the straw man fallacy. Traditional studies of this fallacy have focused on the changes that occur when a discussant represents another’s speech acts. This places undue normative significance on the question of “How much change is too much change?”, a question that has constantly eluded theorizing. I argue that in a dualist framework, when the evidentiary mode of the fallacy is taken as a starting point, the evaluation can begin with the phenomenon of deceit (as a marker of fallaciousness) and construct critical responses without the need to demonstrate that the change induced was in some sense disproportionate. To make this point, I give both imaginary and real-life examples of such evaluations.

Abstract This paper addresses the degree to which straw man arguments are perceived as persuasive by their targets. A review of the literature shows that there is a consensus on the topic, stipulating that using a straw man argument is unlikely to change a person’s views. However, the experimental evidence we have so far on the straw man fallacy only covers third-person scenarios, i.e., when participants act as an audience observing an argumentative exchange between others. This study fills this gap by discussing the second-person straw man, i.e., when the audience for the argument is the target of the straw man representation. It shows that (1) the straw man is indeed not a persuasive tactic, and (2) the political orientation of the statements and the participants also plays a role.

Abstract Twentieth century innovations in reasoning about health and medicine (randomized clinical trials, systematic reviews, and a growing list of other inventions) have dramatically changed what counts as good argumentation within this domain. Though these new forms are often highly specialized and highly technical, they are gradually becoming “norms of public argumentation” (Zenker, et al., 2024), spreading from esoteric discussion among medical scientists into other discourses (including interpersonal exchanges between doctors and patients). This pattern is not limited to health and medicine but affects so many domains that it has become ubiquitous in contemporary argumentative discourse. But innovations aimed at improving reasonableness, when successful, can disrupt preexisting normative frameworks. They can undermine and supplant prior bases for inference, abruptly change standards for argument criticism, and require adoption of different rules for argumentative engagement. The study reported here concerns the volatility that surrounds these innovations in a case study of debate over a controversial treatment for a controversial disease. Close examination of the debate from a normative pragmatic perspective shows much greater normative complexity than has been acknowledged within contemporary argumentation theory, including unexpected volatility in norms that arguers themselves must somehow manage.

This study assesses whether the linguistic choices that Van Haaften and Van Leeuwen identified in the so-called ‘Van Gelder’ court case (as reported in a.o. Journal of Argumentation in Context 10(1), 97-120, 2021) have empirically demonstrable argumentative effects. This case revolves around proceedings that Yuri van Gelder brought against the Dutch Olympic committee, given his removal from the Olympic gymnastics final due to misbehaviour. Van Haaften and Van Leeuwen’s analysis demonstrates that the lawyers used a variety of linguistic choices in their pleas that are argumentatively instrumental for defending their position: Van Gelder’s lawyer uses a series of linguistic choices that serve to minimise the reprehensibility of Van Gelder’s behaviour and paint him as a victim, while the Dutch Olympic committee lawyer’s linguistic choices maximise the reprehensibility of the behaviour and frame Van Gelder as solely responsible for his situation. 209 participants read either an original or a manipulated fragment of one of the pleas and evaluated the reprehensibility of Van Gelder’s behaviour, his responsibility for the situation and their agreement with the judge’s decision (which favoured the Dutch Olympic committee). Results suggest that whether participants had read the original or the manipulated plea did not affect their evaluations. The content of the pleas did matter, however, as participants who read the plea by the Dutch Olympic committee lawyer were more negative about Van Gelder than those who had read Van Gelder’s lawyer’s plea. While the topical selection choices thus do seem to affect readers’ evaluations, our linguistic manipulations of the argumentative moves may have been too subtle to make a difference.

Recent decades have witnessed an increase in the practice of political apologies. This does not, however, mean that apologizing for their past human rights violations is easy for states. Political apology involves a number of complexities that urge the apologizing political authority to make argumentative maneuvers to manage or mitigate the challenges inherent in this activity type. This paper aims to set out the institutional constraints of political apology and characterize it as an argumentative activity type (AAT) by employing the four pragma-dialectical parameters: the initial situation, procedural and material starting points, argumentative means, and possible outcome (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, 2005; van Eemeren 2010). In order to illustrate how the institutional preconditions and the characteristics of the activity type manifest themselves in an actual apology text, the paper presents an analysis of the 2022 apology delivered by the then-Prime Minister Mark Rutte for the Netherland’s role in slavery, focusing on his strategic maneuvers to justify the apology and increase its sincerity and sufficiency. The analysis of Rutte’s maneuvering with the topical potential, audience demand, and presentational devices reveals how he achieves a bold acknowledgement of wrongdoing, a clear and emphatic statement of apology, and indicates directions for recovery.

Nurturing the ability to argue is of great importance in science education, despite students often encountering cognitive and emotional barriers. The aim of this study was to examine the quality of argumentation and the issues raised by secondary school students when they are asked to respond to structured argumentation tasks. We chose topics from two different socio-scientific issues of varied perceived relevance to students’ daily lives: the sale of fast food in school canteens (Group 1) and the addition of antibiotics in animal feed (Group 2). The study involved 249 high school students aged 14–16, in Poland. A total of 139 participants took part in an intervention about fast food, and 110 in an intervention about the use of antibiotics. Data were collected in the form of written arguments developed by students as part of a structured teaching intervention. Quantitative and qualitative methods were used to process and analyze the data. On average, students’ arguments scored higher on the topic of antibiotic use on animal feed. Qualitative content analysis of the students’ arguments identified four thematic groups: (1) personal aspects revealing personal meanings, values, and defence mechanisms; (2) scientific aspects revealing substantive knowledge; (3) socio-cultural aspects revealing economic, sociological or cultural aspects; (4) nonsensical or incoherent arguments. A topic related to students’ personal decisions and perceived to be closest to their lives and daily experience (eating fast food in the school canteen) more often prompted arguments indicating cognitive defence, by denying the harmfulness of fast food and emphasizing possible advantages or appealing to the right to choose. Based on this finding, we discuss the need for defence mechanisms to be considered in pedagogical designs for the teaching of argumentation.

Metaphor is a pragmatic device that might influence how arguments are evaluated. Beyond its cognitive and aesthetic value, metaphor also fosters linguistic intimacy, i.e., the feeling of belonging to an intimate community. The paper hypothesizes that linguistic intimacy might be particularly relevant in ad populum arguments, where a sense of belonging to the community endorsing the argument might influence the acceptance of the conclusion. In ad populum arguments, indeed, metaphors might act as a “concealed invitation” to accept and share a conclusion, encouraging effortful interpretation that results in a feeling of shared community. However, not all ad populum arguments are fallacious: they may reflect reasonable consensus, with the agreement with their conclusion depending on how they are framed. The article presents an empirical study investigating whether conventional and novel emotive metaphors vs. their literal counterparts within ad populum premises increase participants’ acceptance of the argument conclusion. The results showed that especially novel and negative metaphors in the premises make people less prone to evaluate the conclusion of ad populum arguments as logically acceptable, while conventional and positive metaphors in the premises makes them feel intimacy with the group of people supporting the conclusion, more easily leading to agreement with their conclusion.

Research on conditional reasoning has long debated whether human rationality is best captured by logicist accounts or by pragmatically oriented approaches such as Relevance Theory, which highlight contextual and communicative factors. While the former predict reliable adherence to logical schemata (e.g., Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens), experimental evidence consistently reveals systematic deviations, such as endorsement of invalid inferences. The latter view attributes such patterns not to irrationality, but to pragmatic expectations that guide interpretation. This study contributes to this debate by examining how logical validity and pragmatic congruency jointly shape the evaluation of conditional arguments. We report two experiments employing a 2 × 2 factorial design. In Experiment 1, participants evaluated conditional syllogisms framed in the standard 'if/then' format. Results showed that pragmatic violations slowed responses and, crucially, facilitated detection of logical invalidity, without hindering performance on valid arguments. Experiment 2 reformulated the same arguments using the Periodic Table of Arguments to replace 'if/then' conditionals with lever-based structures. Here, participants exhibited a generalized tendency to resist conditional inference, resulting in improved rejection of invalid arguments but reduced recognition of valid ones. Across both studies, pragmatic congruency alone did not predict accuracy, but interactions between pragmatic expectations and logical form systematically influenced evaluations. Taken together, the findings suggest that pragmatics does not override logic but modulates its accessibility: violations of pragmatic expectations invite deliberation. At the same time, semantic scaffolding, such as explicit 'if/then' cues, supports deductive reasoning. We propose that natural argumentation depends on this interplay, highlighting the need for situated accounts of logos.

Previous research in argumentation has closely examined distortions of the opposition—particularly the straw man—and has recently provided some experimental evidence on their effects on persuasive outcomes. However, comparatively little empirical attention has been given to the inverse practice of faithfully reformulating an opponent’s contribution. The effects of accurate and inaccurate representations on speaker ethos and perceived reasonableness also remain underexplored. This paper addresses these gaps through three pre-registered experimental studies comparing accurate reformulation, misrepresentation, and no reformulation of the opposition. Experiment 1 assesses the impact of these practices on perceived trustworthiness using a six-item, 7-point semantic differential scale. Experiment 2 examines judgments of reasonableness using a scale repeatedly employed in pragma-dialectical effectiveness research. Experiment 3 measures persuasiveness at both the attitudinal and behavioral intention levels. Participants read a series of pre-tested argumentative exchanges between two speakers in a charitable-giving context. Results show that, in the cases examined, misrepresenting the opposition negatively impacted both trustworthiness and reasonableness judgments, addressing concerns that adhering to dialectical standards may diminish rhetorical success.

The paper investigates whether contradictory arguments are less likely to be noticed when they are expressed implicitly rather than explicitly. It builds on the fact that—in natural language productions—contradictions are often not logical but rather—lato sensu—pragmatic in nature. The study presents an experiment using ecological and slightly modified material. In a Facebook post, Italian journalist Selvaggia Lucarelli conveyed two contradictory arguments through implicatures, presuppositions and vague expressions. This text was presented to experimental subjects: half read the original version, while the other half read a version in which the implicit content had been made explicit. Their responses to specific questions indicate that the contradiction is more easily noticed when it occurs between explicit assertions rather than between arguments that must be at least partially inferred. A strong effect is observed in relation to age and education differences among the groups. These results may provide experimental insight into the conditions under which argumentation flawed by contradictions may still achieve its intended effect, as if the contradiction were not present.

Abstract Personal attacks, which might convey damaging accusations, can take either an explicit or an implicit form. When they are communicated implicitly, they are referred to as insinuations . Their implicit nature is said to allow speakers to evade responsibility, preserve their public image, or even conceal argumentative weaknesses. In previous studies, we found that insinuated ad hominem arguments supporting disagreement made speakers appear more persuasive and trustworthy than explicit ones. However, further exploratory analyses of our data revealed that the advantage of insinuated over explicit ad hominem arguments was either only present or more pronounced when the personal attack was fallacious. This distinction between explicitness and fallaciousness —and their possible interaction—had not been accounted for in earlier work. To investigate this interaction more systematically, we conducted four preregistered experiments examining the combined effects of explicitness and fallaciousness in ad hominem arguments. Results indicate that there is no significant interaction between fallaciousness and implicitness, regardless of whether the personal attack targets the proponent’s expertise or character. While the often-assumed persuasive benefits of insinuation do not consistently emerge—and may even undermine argumentative support in the context of disagreemen—insinuation confers social advantages, as the speaker is perceived as more trustworthy overall. Moreover, valid arguments are consistently preferred over fallacious ones—not only when it comes to supporting disagreement, but also in shaping how the speaker is perceived. This suggests that while pragmatic subtleties, such as insinuation, can enhance perceived trustworthiness, argumentative soundness remains a central criterion in both rhetorical and interpersonal judgments.

Argumentation is at the core of political communication. We study what criteria people use when they evaluate argument quality. We ask how justification content and argument source – who presents the argument – influence perceived argument quality, as well as how these two interact. Regarding justification content, we rely on criteria derived from deliberative democracy, and separate appeals to common or private interests. Regarding argument source, we study partial, impartial and reluctant sources. The promoted policy is in accordance with the interests of partial sources, it conflicts with the interests of reluctant sources, whereas impartial sources’ interests are not affected. We observed that appeals to common interest yielded higher perceived argument and justification quality compared to appeals to private interests. Our central observation was that sources did not influence perceived argument quality, unless arguments appealed to private interests. In other words, the influence of the argument source was contingent on argument content.

Abstract The use of social media influencers as a rhetorical strategy contributes significantly to reshaping Emmanuel Macron’s public image. Aimed at countering the perception of distance conveyed in his initial Covid-19 speeches, this study explores the strategy’s rhetorical mechanisms, illustrated by a surprising encounter with two Youtubers, presented as a reward. I argue that Macron’s ethos is redefined through a deliberate balance between authority and proximity – both crucial to his image repair. The influencers’ unique format enables the implementation of this dual strategy, but they go even further by functioning as intermediaries who assist the president in adapting his discourse to align with the expectations, language, and values of their followers. In this encounter, ethos serves as both a means and an end. The collaboration between the politician and the influencers raises several critical questions: How is the strategy constructed? Who holds authority, and upon which models of authority does each party construct and articulate their discourse? How does this interaction affect the president’s style and language? What are the characteristics of their interaction? This analysis explores how influencers shape Macron’s communication and reveals distinctive features of his rhetoric within this unique format. In doing so, broader questions emerge about the boundaries between rhetoric, argumentation, and manipulation.

Discussions about multimodal argumentation have long been hindered by doubts about whether non-verbal artifacts can express propositions. The opponents of multimodal argumentation have stated that semiotic modes other than language lack the precision required to express verifiable statements about the world. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the account of propositions presented in speech act theory is suitable for analyzing multimodal communication, which is why multimodal argumentation can be studied in the pragma-dialectical tradition. By connecting Searle’s approach with the pragma-dialectic argumentation schemes, I suggest that the propositional act is constructed of three, and not two, elements: referring expression, predicating quality, and proposition scheme, the latter being a characterization of the relationship between the first two. I derive proposition schemes directly from argumentation schemes, noticing that the pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes actually characterize the relationship within propositions, and not between them. Based on that notion, I argue that when interacting with seemingly ambiguous multimodal artifacts, the receiver automatically chooses the most probable connection between the referring expression and the predicating quality from the list of proposition schemes, explaining why multimodal communication can be easily interpreted intuitively. Finally, I analyze several argumentative examples to illustrate how the proposition schemes can be used in reconstructing the reasoning expressed multimodally.

Abstract Scholars have expressed widespread concern about voters’ ability to critically evaluate political messages, particularly in light of recent democratic outcomes such as the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit referendum. This study investigates whether written instructions alone—without interpersonal interaction—can enhance individuals’ ability to assess the strength of arguments. Drawing on the argument scheme approach and its associated critical questions, we establish a standard of argument quality and a method for evaluating arguments. In an experimental study, we test whether instructions on using critical questions improve participants’ evaluations of political arguments, and whether repeated exposure strengthens this effect. The results show that participants who received repeated instructions distinguished more clearly between low- and high-quality arguments than those who received instructions only once or not at all, suggesting an improved ability to evaluate political arguments.

The phenomenon of selective dispute avoidance is that there are issues we debate and issues we recoil from debating, despite the fact that they are very similar in values at stake. What accounts for this variance? That some disagreements are deep and engagements on some deep issues yields meta-argumentatively bad results is a plausible explanation. However, practical second-order rebutting reasons to these considerations are proposed, essentially that not engaging has foreseeably worse consequences than engaging. What favors engagement, then, is that only when engaged can one address the negative second-order reasons one yields on either approach. What follows is a pragmatic meta-argument for engagement, even in cases of deep disagreement.